Verification of Low-level Crypto-Protocol Implementations Using Automated Theorem Proving

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Software Engineering & Security

„Penetrate-and-patch“ (aka „banana strategy“):
• insecure
• disruptive

Traditional formal methods: limited adoption in industry.
• training people
• constructing formal specifications.
Model-based Security

Increase security with bounded investment in time, costs:

• Extract models from artefacts arising in industrial development and use of security-critical systems (UML models, source code, configuration data).

• Tool-supported, theoretically sound, efficient automated security analysis.
Model-based Security Engineering

- Analyze (UMLsec) models against security requirements.
- Generate code (or tests) from models.
- Generate models from evolving or legacy code.

Goal: model-based = source-code based.
Security Analysis of C-Programs

Goal: Logic-based security verification of C programs which is as
• automatic and
• complete
as possible.

Note: can‘t be both perfectly automated and complete: Security in general undecidable.

Here: emphasize automation.
Crypto-Hardware API‘s (PKCS 11)

Here: support correct use of PKCS 11 API‘s.
Keep track of session handles.

C_GetAttributeValue obtains attribute value
C_SetAttributeValue modifies attribute value
C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data
C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data
C_Digest digests single-part data
C_Sign signs single-part data
C_VerifyRecover verifies signature, data recovered
C_GenerateKey generates a secret key
C_GenerateKeyPair generates a key pair
C_GenerateRandom generates random data
Security Analysis

Following Dolev, Yao (1982): To analyze system, verify against attacker model from threat scenarios in deployment diagrams who

• may participate in some protocol runs,
• knows some data in advance,
• may intercept messages on some links,
• injects messages that it can produce in some links
• may access certain nodes.
Adversary: Simulation

A \quad \text{Adversary} \quad B

\text{Adversary knowledge:} \quad k^{-1}, y, x, \{z\}_k, z

\forall e, k. Dec_{k^{-1}}(\{e\}_k) = e
Control Flow Graph

Generate control flow graph (e.g. with aicall (Absint, Germany)).

Transform to Mealy Machines:
trans (state, inpattern, condition, action, nextstate)
where action can be outpattern or localvar := value.

Translate to abstract interpretation in FOL formula.
Security Analysis in First-order Logic

Approximate set of possible data values flowing through system from above.

Predicate \( \text{knows}(E) \) meaning that the adversary may get to know \( E \) during the execution of the protocol.

E.g. secrecy: For any secret \( s \), check whether can derive \( \text{knows}(s) \) using automated theorem prover.
Cryptographic Expressions I

\( \text{Exp: quotient of term algebra generated from sets Data, Keys, Var of symbols using} \)

- \( _::: \) (concatenation), \( \text{head}(\_), \text{tail}(\_), \)
- \( (\_)^{-1} \) (inverse keys)
- \( \{ \_ \} \) (encryption)
- \( \text{Dec}(\_ \_ \_ \_ ) \) (decryption)
- \( \text{Sign}(\_ \_ \_ \_ ) \) (signing)
- \( \text{Ext}(\_ \_ \_ \_ ) \) (extracting from signature)

(each w. session parameter) and equations:
Cryptographic Expressions II

- $\forall E, K, S, S', S''. \text{Dec}_{K;S''^{-1}}(\{E;S\}_K;S')=E$
- $\forall E, K, S, S', S''. \text{Ext}_K(\text{Sign}_K;S^{-1}(E;S);S')=E$
- $\forall E_1, E_2, S, S'. \text{head}(E_1 ::_S E_2;S')=E_1$
- $\forall E_1, E_2, S, S'. \text{tail}(E_1 ::_S E_2;S')=E_2$

Write $E_1 :: E_2 :: E_3$ for $E_1 :: (E_2 :: E_3)$ and $\text{fst}(E_1 :: E_2)$ for $\text{head}(E_1 :: E_2)$ etc.

Can include further crypto-specific primitives and laws (XOR, ...).
First-order Logic: Basic Rules

Define $knows(E)$ for any $E$ initially known to the adversary.

For evolving knowledge define

$$
\forall E_1, E_2, S. (knows(E_1) \land knows(E_2) \Rightarrow \left(knows(E_1::_SE_2) \land knows({E_1;}_{SE_2}) \land \right.
\left.knows(Dec_{E_2}(E_1;S)) \land knows(Sign_{E_2}(E_1;S)) \land
\right. \left.knows(Ext_{E_2}(E_1;S)))\right)
$$

$$
\forall E, S. (knows(E) \Rightarrow \left(knows(head(E;S)) \land knows(tail(E;S)))\right)
$$
… Translate to 1st Order Logic

Graph transition

$TR_1 = (in(msg_{in}), \text{cond}(msg_{in}), out(msg_{out}))$

followed by $TR_2$ gives predicate

$PRED(TR_1) = \forall msg_{in}. \left[ \text{knows}(msg_{in}) \land \text{cond}(msg_{in}) \Rightarrow \text{knows}(msg_{out}) \land PRED(TR_2) \right]$

Abstraction (e.g. from senders, receivers): find all attacks, may have false positives.

Check whether can derive threat conjecture (e.g. $\text{knows}(s)$ for a secret $s$) from axioms.
Example: Proposed Variant of TLS (SSL)

Presented at IEEE Infocom 1999.

Goal: send secret protected by session key using fewer server resources.
Example: Translation to Logic

\[\text{knows}(N) \land \text{knows}(K_C) \land \text{knows}(\text{Sign}_{K_C^{-1}}(C::K_C)) \]
\[\land \forall \text{init}_1, \text{init}_2, \text{init}_3. [\text{knows}(\text{init}_1) \land \text{knows}(\text{init}_2) \land \text{knows}(\text{init}_3) \land \text{snd}(\text{Ext}_{\text{init}_2}(\text{init}_3)) = \text{init}_2 \]
\[\Rightarrow \text{knows}((\text{Sign}_{K_S^{-1}}(\ldots))_\ldots) \land [\ldots] \land [...] \land [...] \Rightarrow [...]]\ldots\]
Preprocessing of code

For simplification and efficiency apply semantics-preserving transformations to the C program:

- use of single-assignment variables
- eliminate side effects
- factor out pointer arithmetic

Analyze loops up to a fixed number of iterations. No so much of a restriction when analyzing secure interactions in crypto protocols.

Include annotations to abstract cryptofunctions etc.
void TLS_Client(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, // session handle
    CK_BYTE_PTR pSecretData, // secret as plaintext data
    CK_ULONG ulDataLen // plaintext bytes
)

CK_BYTE Resp_1 [MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN];
CK_BYTE Resp_2 [MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN];
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData = NULL;
// allocate and prepare buffers
pEncryptedData = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc (ulDataLen);

memset (pEncryptedData, 0x00, ulDataLen);

send (n); // C->S: Init

send (k_c);

send (Cert_c_ca); // => sign(conc(c, k_c), inv(k_ca))

recv (Resp_1); // S->C: Receive Server's respond
recv (Resp_2);

// Check Guards
if ((memcmp(fst(C_Ext(hSession, Resp_2, ID_k_ca)),
    s, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN) == 0) &&
    (memcmp(snd(C_Ext(hSession, C_Dec(hSession, Resp_1,
                         C_Inv(hSession, ID_k_c)),
                     snd(C_Ext(hSession, Resp_2, ID_k_ca))))),
    n, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN) == 0))

// C->S: Send Secret
send (C_Symenc(hSession, pSecretData, fst(C_Ext(hSession,
                  C_Dec(hSession, Resp_1, C_Inv(ID_k_c)),
              snd(C_Ext(hSession, Resp_2, ID_k_ca))))));

// free temporary buffers
free (pEncryptedData);

exit
Surprise …

Can derive \textit{knows}(s). That is: Protocol does \textbf{not} preserve secrecy of \texttt{s} against adversaries.

\rightarrow Completely insecure wrt stated goals.

But why? Use prolog-based attack generator.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack

\[ \text{C} \rightarrow \text{A} \rightarrow \text{S} \]

\[ \text{N}_i::\text{K}_C::\text{Sign}_{K_C^{-1}}(\text{C}::\text{K}_C) \]

\[ \text{C} \leftarrow \text{A} \leftarrow \text{S} \]

\[ \text{A} \rightarrow \text{S} \]

\[ \text{N}_i::\text{K}_A::\text{Sign}_{K_A^{-1}}(\text{C}::\text{K}_A) \]

\[ \{\text{Sign}_{K_S^{-1}}(\text{K}_j::\text{N}_i)\}_{K_A}::\text{Sign}_{K_{CA}^{-1}}(\text{S}::\text{K}_S) \]

\[ \text{C} \leftarrow \text{A} \leftarrow \text{S} \]

\[ \{\text{Sign}_{K_S^{-1}}(\text{K}_j::\text{N}_i)\}_{K_C}::\text{Sign}_{K_{CA}^{-1}}(\text{S}::\text{K}_S) \]

\[ \{s\}_{K_j} \rightarrow \text{A} \rightarrow \{s\}_{K_j} \rightarrow \text{S} \]
Biometric Authentication System

In development by large German company.

In joint project, use presented security analysis tools at given UML specification.

So far, have discovered three major attacks against subsequently improved versions (misuse counter circumvented by dropping / replaying messages, smart-card insufficiently authenticated by recombining sessions).
Conclusions

Code security verification using assertions:
• formally based approach
• automated tool support
• industrially used programming language
• integrated approach (specifications, source-code, configuration data)

Future:
• Virtual C execution machine in tptp instead of manual code tptp annotations…
Resources

TUM TB Dez. ‘04 (with T. Kuhn)
International Conference for
Software Maintenance 2005
Models / UML 2005 (with S. Houmb)

More information (papers, slides, tool, ...): http://www4.in.tum.de/~juerjens
Abstraction

Enable efficient automated analysis by abstraction (e.g. functions or code-blocks):

- **symbolic** representation of cryptographic or arithmetic routines
- **technical infrastructure** (packet_send, buffer_copy, …)
- **data structures** (e.g. a->b)

Factor out pointers usage.
Sequence Diagram Specification

\[ \text{tls:} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{init}(N_i, K_C, \text{Sign}_{K_C^{-1}}(C::K_C)) \\
\text{resp}\left(\{\text{Sign}_{K_{S_i}^{-1}}(k_j::N')\}_K, \text{Sign}_{K_{CA}^{-1}}(S_i::K_{S_i})\right) \\
x\text{chd}\left(\{s_i\}_k\right) \\
\text{snd}(\text{Ext}_{K_C}(c_c)) = K_C \]
\end{align*} \]
Code Annotations

```c
#ifndef_TLS_C2TPTP_H
#define_TLS_C2TPTP_H

//@C2TPTP_START
// SEND (send, 3)
// RECEIVE (rcv, 2)
// CONST const_c_cert_ca := sign(conc(c, k_c), inv(k_ca))
// CONST const_s_cert_ca := sign(conc(s, k_s), inv(k_ca))
//@C2TPTP_END

#endif // _TLS_C2TPTP_H
```

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TLS Overview
routine: TLS_Client

```c
void TLS_Client (char* secret)

char* Resp_1;
char* Resp_2;
// allocate and prepare buffers
Resp_1 = (char *) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

Resp_2 = (char *) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset (Resp_1, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset (Resp_2, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);
```
Client II

```c
// C->S: Init
send (n);

send (k_c);

const_c_cert_ca

// S->C: Receive Server's respond
recv (Resp_1);

recv (Resp_2);

if ( // Check Guards
    (memcmp(fst(ext(Resp_2, k_ca)), s, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN) == 0) &&
    (memcmp(snd(ext(dec(Resp_1, inv(k_c))), snd(ext(Resp_2, k_ca))), n,
         MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN) == 0))

// C->S: Send Secret
send (symenc(secret, fst(ext(dec(Resp_1, inv(k_c))), snd(ext(Resp_2, k_ca)))));

free (Resp_1); // free temporary buffers

free (Resp_2);

exit
```
routine: TLS_Server

char* TLS_Server()

char* Init_1;
char* Init_2;
char* Init_3;
char* k_tmp;
char* EncSecret;
char* RetVal = NULL;
// allocate and prepare buffers
Init_1 = (char*) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

Init_2 = (char*) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

Init_3 = (char*) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

EncSecret = (char*) malloc(MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset(Init_1, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset(Init_2, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset(Init_3, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);

memset(EncSecret, 0x00, MESSAGEBUFF_MAXLEN);
The Fix

e-Setheo: \textit{knows(s)} not derivable. Thus „secure“ in above sense.
Interpretation

Why examine knows(s) rather than secret(s) ?

» Really only care about initial models of the axioms (basic axioms, protocol axioms and initial adversary knowledge) - our „idealized implementation“. Models basic assumptions on the security of the cryptographic algorithms (viewed at our level of abstraction): Cryptographic data does not fulfill any unintended equations (or the adversary cannot learn these).
Modular Verification: Idea

For given protocol try to establish assertions
\[ a_1 \rightarrow g_1. \]
Include into C code as annotations. Check whether axioms together with annotations entail threat conjecture.
Modular Verification: Example

If for protocol p1, basic axioms, protocol axioms and initial adversary knowledge entails knows(s) (have counter-example) then in the initial model satisfying these axioms (our „idealized implementation“) the adversary can learn s. We generate the assertion

\[ \text{init\_knowledge\_axioms} \rightarrow \text{knows}(s) \]

(Careful: cannot just generate \( \rightarrow \text{not(knows(s))} \) otherwise without possible inconsistency.)
Modular Verification: Application

Forged smart-card after authentic.; replay old session key

Mutual authentication with challenge & response

Generate shared key
Control Flow graph to State Machine
CFG to State Machine I
CFG to State Machine II
TLS Variant in TPTP notation

```plaintext
input_formula(tls_abstract_protocol, axiom,
  ![ArgS_11, ArgS_12, ArgS_13, ArgC_11, ArgC_12] : (  
    ![DataC_KK, DataC_k, DataC_n] : (  
      % Client -> Attacker (1. message)  
      (  
        knows(n)
        & knows(k_c)
        & knows(sign(conc(c, k_c), inv(k_c)) ) )
      & % Server -> Attacker (2. message)  
      (  
        knows(ArgS_11)
        & knows(ArgS_12)
        & knows(ArgS_13)
        & ( ? [X] : equal( sign(conc(X, ArgS_12), inv(ArgS_12)),  
                        ArgS_13 ) )
      )  
    )
  )  
⇒ (  
    knows(enc(sign(conc(kgen(ArgS_12), ArgS_11), inv(k_s)),  
                ArgS_12))
    & knows(sign(conc(s, k_s), inv(k_ca)))
  )
```
TLS Variant in TPTP notation II

& % Client -> Attacker (3. message)
( ( knows(ArgC_11)
  & knows(ArgC_12)
  & equal(sign(conc(s, DataC_KK), inv(k_ca)), ArgC_12 )
  & equal(enc(sign(conc(DataC_k, DataC_n), inv(DataC_KK)), k_c), ArgC_11 )
  & ( ? [DataC_ks] : equal(sign(conc(s, DataC_ks), inv(k_ca)), ArgC_12 ) )
  & equal(enc(sign(conc(DataC_k, n), inv(DataC_KK)), k_c), ArgC_11 )
  & equal(enc(sign(conc(DataC_k, DataC_n), inv(DataC_KK)), k_c), ArgC_11 )
)
=> ( knows(symenc(secret, DataC_k)) ) )
)) }}.